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THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES
OF DIVORCE*
Wm. TURNEY Fox**
The question of the recognition of foreign decrees of divorce is one of real and growing importance. The conflict
of law that exists in this country, where divorces are grant,
ed by one state and their validity tested in another, is one
that is familiar to the legal profession. In fact, it is familiar to the public generally. The unfortunate situation of
persons legally divorced in one state and not in another; of
a second marriage valid in one state, declared invalid in
another; and the general confusion resulting from such
conflict is constantly presented to the public through the
daily press and current magazines. It now appears that
there is to be added to this chaos, the confusion of divorce
decrees granted in foreign countries to citizens of our own
country who have sojourned therein only long enough to
obtain the decree and then bring it home.
It is my purpose to attempt an analysis of the underlying principles concerning divorce decrees rendered by
the courts of one state and for which recognition is sought
in others; and then by analogy to seek to determine, so far
as is possible by this process of reasoning, the status in the
courts of this country of divorce decrees rendered by the
courts of foreign countries.
It will, perhaps, be helpful at the outset to attempt the
statement of a few general basic principles. First, it seems
to be the generally accepted doctrine in this country that,
so far as the subject matter of the controversy is concerned,
actions for divorce deal with the status of the parties; that
it is an action in rem or quasi in rem, the marital status,
though intangible in nature, being the res; and that the
recognition of a decree in another jurisdiction depends primarily on jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree
over this res. As a corollary to this proposition, it seems
'
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that a court does not have jurisdiction over this res unless
one of the parties is domiciled in the jurisdiction where the
decree is granted and has lived there for the time fixed by
the local statutes. While Section 128 of our Civil Code,
which lays down the conditions upon which one may maintain an action for divorce in this state, uses the term "resident," reference to other sections of our codes and statements in our reports, seem to indicate that the principles of
domicile are the foundation stones of jurisdiction in such
cases. This is indicated by the provisions of Section 128 of
the Civil Code, which provides, as amended in 1925, that
"In actions for divorce neither the domicile nor residence of
the husband shall be deemed the domicile or residence of
the wife;" and that, "For the purpose of such an action
each may have a separate domicile or residence, depending
upon proof of the fact and not upon legal presumption."
Reference to Section 52 of the Political Code, which lays down
the rules for determining residence, seems to support this conclusion also. In that section seven rules are given for
determining residence. An analysis of these rules shows
that they are the rules made use of in determining domicile. As typically illustrating this proposition reference is
made to only four of the shorter rules. Rule two provides,
"There can'be only one residence ;"rule three that, "A residence cannot be lost until another is gained ;"rule five that,
"The residence of the husband is the residence of the wife;"
and rule seven that, "The residence can be changed only
by the union of act and intent."
Our Supreme Court, as well. as the Supreme Court of the
United States, has from time to time made statements which
seem to bear out this conclusion. As early as 1865 our
Supreme Court, in the case of Bennett v. Bennett,' made
the statement that: "The tribunals of a country have no
jurisdiction over a cause of divorce, if neither of the parties
has an actual bona fide domicile within the territory." A
similar statement was made by our Chief Justice, then a
Justice of the Appellate Court, in the case of Anthony v. Tarpleyj.2 In that case he said: "As distinguished from legal
domicile, mere residence within a particular state of the
(1865).
2.45 CaL. App. 72, 187 Pac. '779 (1919).
1 28 Cal. 559
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plaintiff in a divorce cause, brought in a court of such
state, is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon such court
to dissolve the marriage relation existing between the plaintiff and a non-resident defendant." This language was taken from the opinion of Mr. Justice White in Haddock v. Haddock." Further on in the opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Waste
said: "As, according to the complaint, neither of the parties to the divorce action had a legal domicile in the State
of Oregon, the want of jurisdiction in the court of that
state to entertain the divorce action is clear." However,
it should be borne in mind that domicile alone, as defined
in international law, is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction;
for a party may be domiciled, in that sense, in a jurisdiction
in which he has not lived for years. Our familiar statutory
provisions must, of course, also be complied with. This
principle is illustrated by the well-known case of De La Montanya v. De La Montanya.4 Not only must these requirements be met so far as the individual is concerned, but since
the decree is in rem or quasi in rem, if it is to be entitled to
recognition in other jurisdictions, particularly under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, that domicile must be of such a character or acquired under such
circumstances as to carry along with it the res as a basis
for giving the court jurisdiction over it. This proposition
is illustrated by the famous Haddock and Atherton cases,
which will be discussed later.
We may now turn to the consideration of a few typical
situations regarding the recognition by the courts of one
jurisdiction of decrees of divorce granted by the courts of
another. So far as the states of the union are concerned
such recognition depends either upon the principles of comity or upon the effect of the full faith and credit clause of
the Federal Constitution. With respect, however, to such
decrees, granted by the courts of foreign countries, their
recognition by the courts of this country depends entirely
upon principles of comity.
First of all, it is not open to question that where the
husband and wife are domiciled in a state-and have lived
together there for the period fixed by statute-there exists
- 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
' 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 845 (1896).
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jurisdiction in the courts of such state, for good cause, to
enter a decree of divorce which will be entitled to enforcement in another state by virtue of the full faith and credit
clause.
It has also been decided by the United States Supreme
5 that where
Court in Cheever v. Wilsonr
a bona fide domicile
has been acquired in a state by either of the parties to
the marriage, and a suit is brought by the domiciled
party in such state for divorce, the courts of that state,
if they acquire personal jurisdiction also of the other
party, have authority to enter a decree of divorce, entitled
to be enforced in every state by virtue of the full faith and
credit clause.
From an international point of view the same conclusions
would be reached on the principle of comity. That such
is the law of England and Scotland is shown by such cases
as Harvey v. Farnie.6 That the same results would be reached
by the courts of this country is shown by such cases as Miller
v. Miller,7 Sorenson v. Sorenson,8 and McGrew v. Mutual Life
Insurance Company.9 In this connection it might be noted
that decrees granted by the courts of foreign countries will
be recognized by our courts on the principle of comity, although the decree may have been granted for a cause that
would not have been a ground for divorce in this country
and through a procedure wholly unknown to our law. In
the Miller case the parties were Russian subjects and appeared before a rabbi and were divorced according to the
Jewish and Russian law. In passing on the validity of the
decree the court said: "The effect of the power delegated
to the rabbis to grant divorces was substantially to create
an ecclesiastical court, recognized as such in the Russian
Empire; and their pronouncement of sentence of divorce
has the same effect in that country as like sentences have in
the courts of our states."
In the California case just cited the parties were, at the
time the action was begun, residing in and domiciled in
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands. The husband was declared to
. 9 Wan. (U. S.) 108 (1869).
OL. R. 8 A. C. 48 (1882).
128 N. Y. S. 787 (1911).
8 202 N. Y. S. 620 (1924).
9 182 Cal. 85, 64 Pac. 103 (1901).
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be an incompetent and a guardian was appointed. An action for divorce was later started by the husband through
his guardian against the defendant wife. Although a decree could not have been obtained in California under such
a procedure, our court recognized the validity of the Hawaiian decree upon the principle of comity. We find the
English courts applying the same principles under similar
circumstances. This is brought out in a case before the
Privy Council, Le Mesumier v. Le Mesurier.10
We may now turn our attention to the situation where
one party, say the husband, deserts the other and goes to
another jurisdiction and there establishes a personal domicile and secures a divorce in such jurisdiction upon constructive service and then sets up this decree as a defense, when
sued in the jurisdiction where the parties last lived together.
This is substantially the famous Haddock Case. It will be recalled that the United States Supreme Court held that the ex
prte decree of the husband, obtained in Connecticut, was not
entitled to recognition in another state, under the full faith
and credit clause, although the majority opinion proceeded
upon the assumption that the decree Mr. Haddoqk had obtained in Connecticut was valid in that state because of the
inherent power which all governments must possess over
the marriage relation, its formation and dissolution as regards its own citizens. It would therefore seem to follow
that in the State of Connecticut Mr. Haddock's status was
that of an unmarried man and that he was legally free to
contract another marriage, which he did, in fact, but that
in the State of New York he was still the lawful husband of
the first Mrs. Haddock. The reasoning by which thg anomalous result was reached may perhaps be re-examined with
profit. Mr. Haddock, of course, to get his decree in Connecticut must have been able to convince the court that he
was domiciled there and that he was the innocent
party. If then he was the innocent party it would seem
to necessarily follow that he took with him the marital
status, thereby giving to the court jurisdiction of the
subject matter-the res--as well as submitting himself
to the jurisdiction by filing the suit, and therefore the
judgment would be entitled to recognition everywhere. But
10 L. R. (1895) A. C. 517.
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before any such conclusion is to be accepted another query
must be made. And that is, what was, in fact, the nature of
the jurisdiction the Connecticut court had acquired? We are
familiar with the proposition that before a judgment of a
court of one state is entitled to recognition by the court of
another state, the court rendering the original judgment
must have had proper jurisdiction. Now did the Connecticut court have such jurisdiction as to entitle its decree to
recognition by the courts of other states? The fact that
the court of the first jurisdiction assumes that it has proper
jurisdiction is not sufficient to foreclose the matter; neither
is. the fact that the court rendering the original judgment
recites on its record all necessary jurisdictional facts conclusive. The judgment may still be attacked collaterally for
lack of jurisdiction. This proposition was announced at an
early date by our United States Supreme Court in Thompson
v. Whitman1 1 and has since frequently been repeated. This
is also the rule in California, as shown by such cases as In re
Jcmes,'2 and many others.
Now let us see what the situation is. The court of the
second jurisdiction may find, as the New York court did in
the Haddock case, that the one who obtained the decree in
the first jurisdiction was the guilty party and by reason of
being the guilty party, or deserter, as in that case, did not
take with him the res or marital status and therefore the
res remained in t~hat jurisdiction with the party that court
finds to be the innocent party. Therefore, the innocent
party could not be deemed even to be constructively within
the first jurisdiction, and was not individually domiciled
in said jurisdiction and was only constructively served. The
conclusion then reached is that the court granting the first
decree did not acquire such jurisdiction of the marital
status or res, or of the defendant personally as to compel
the courts of other states to recognize its decree.
One of the difficulties presented is the fact that the court
of each jurisdiction has reached a different conclusion as
to which of the parties was at fault. Which court's conclusion on this question is entitled to the greater weight? It
must be remembered that the original decree was granted
18 WaRl. (U. S.) 457 (1873).
99 Cal. 874, 33 Pac. 1122 (1893).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss2/3

6

Fox: The Recognition of Foreign Decrees of Divorce
THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES OF DIVORCE 145
on an ex parte application; that the defendant in that action
did not appear; and that there was no contest. Under
such circumstances it is relatively easy for a plaintiff in
such a situation to make out a sufficient'case to get a decree. However, in the second jurisdiction both parties
are before the court; the case is contested; both sides may
be heard from. There is therefor less opportunity to impose upon the court and a far greater probability that the
court will make a correct finding as to who was really
at fault, and therefore it seems more reasonable to give conclusive effect to the finding of the court in the second jurisdiction.
The result may perhaps also be supported upon another
theory by starting with what seems to be an accepted doctrine, viz., that each state maintains a complete and exclusive jurisdiction, for most purposes, over all persons and
things within its territorial limits and particularly the wide
scope of authority which each government possesses, according to its policy, over the contract of marriage and its
dissolution. As pointed out by Mr. Justice White, if one
government, because of authority over its own citizen, has
the right to dissolve the marriage tie between one of its
citizens and that of another jurisdiction, it must follow
that no government possesses as to its own citizens complete
power over the marriage relation and its dissolution even
within its own territorial limits. For if it be that one government, by virtue of its authority over its own citizen, may
dissolve the marriage bond as to citizens of another government, other governments would have a similar power, and
hence the right of every government as to its own citizens
might be rendered nugatory by the exercise of the power by
some other government. This anomalous result is made
more manifest when we consider that at the time t1le constitution was adopted, the states possessed full power over
the subject of marriage and divorce and that prior to its
adoption the extent to which one state would recognize a
divorce decree obtained in another depended upon its conception of duty and comity. It must also be remembered
that the constitution delegated no authority to the government of the United States on the subject of marriage and
divorce. And yet, if a decree such as Mr. Haddock ob-
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taned in Connecticut had to be recognized by the other
states because of the full faith and credit clause, it would
follow that the destruction of the power of the state over
the dissolution of marriage, as to its own citizens, would be
brought about by the operation of this clause of the constitution. And as the government of the United States has
no delegated authority on the subject, that government
would be powerless to prevent the evil thus brought about
by the full faith and credit clause. Thus neither the state
nor the federal government would be able to exert that
power over the marriage tie possessed by every other civilized government.
I fully appreciate that there are many cogent arguments
that may be made for a different ruling in such a case, but
it would probably not be profitable here to enter into an
academic discussion of these various theories. They have
been very admirably stated by the judges who dissented in
the Haddock case and by many of our very able legal
thinkers and Writers Who have criticized the majority opinion even to the extent of becoming sarcastic. It is true
that the decision may occasionally place an individual in
an awkward situation, but it is perhaps also true that a
contrary decision would have resulted in placing other individuals in just as unfortunate positions. But, at any rate,
whether we agree with the decision of the majority of the
United States Supreme Court in that case or not, or with the
reasoning by which the result was reached, it still remains
the law.
In our own state we find the Haddock case referred to
apparently with approval in the case of Bruguiere v. Bruguiere.1 8 In that case the parties lived in San Francisco as husband and wife. The husband abandoned the wife without cause
and went to Nevada. After having stayed there for the period
fixed by the Nevada statute he secured a divorce upon service
by publication. Re later married and came back to California
to live with his second wife. Up to this point the facts are exactly in line with the Haddock case. But then, the first wife,
knowing the Nevada decree, went east and married another
man. She later learned that the Nevada decree was not valid
172 Ca]. 199, 155 Pac. 988 (1916).
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because the residence was not bona fide and had her second
marriage annulled on the ground that she was not legally divorced and therefore could not legally remarry. After securing
the annulment of her second marriage she came back to California and started a separate maintenance suit against Mr.
Bruguiere. He set up the Nevada decree. Our Supreme
Court discussed the Haddock case at considerable length
and closed their d;scussion by this statement: "Upon the
principles thus established, it seems clear that the decree
obtained by the husband in Nevada is not binding upon the
courts of California, even if his residence there was bona fide."
It is true that this statement is dictum, because the court
finally held that the wife was estopped to question the validity of the Nevada decree, because she had acted upon it
by her subsequent marriage, but it shows the attitude of
our own Court on the question.
We should now consider what might perhaps be termed
a limitation Upon the doctrine of the Haddock case. This
limitation is illustrated by the situation where the parties
are domiciled in and have lived together in a particular
state and one of them wrongfully abandons the other and
flees to another jurisdiction. The courts of the state where
the parties last lived together, which is known as the "matrimonial domicile," have jurisdiction under the authority of
Atherton v. Atherton,14 to render a decree which will be entitled to full faith and credit under the constitution even
upon constructive service, since they have jurisdiction of
the party there domiciled and of the marital status or
res. It seems that one of the theories upon which this
conclusion is reached is that since the absent party is unjustifiably away, that party cannot, by reason of the
wrongful act, take along the marital status and that therefore the marital status or res must remain with the-innocent
party in the domicile of matrimony, thereby giving to the
courts of that state such jurisdiction that they can render
a decree that is entitled to recognition in all other states.
Another theory upon which the same result is reached is
to disregard the unjustifiable absence and treat the absent
party's domicile as still being in the state of the "matri14 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
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monial domicile" for the purpose of the dissolution of the
marriage. This might be called a constructive domicile.
But whatever theory is followed a practical difficulty
is encountered which is very hard to solve upon any very
satisfactory and logical basis. You will recall that I have already pointed out that the United States Supreme Court
held at a fairly early date that the jurisdiction of the court
granting the original decree might be inquired into when
recognition was sought for that decree in the courts of another state. You will also recall that this was done in the
Haddock Case.
In the Atherton Case the situation was this: Atherton
and his wife were domiciled in and lived together in Kentucky. Mrs. Atherton went away to New York. Mr. Atherton continued to live in Kentucky and later filed an action
for divorce in the Kentucky court, securing only constructive service upon the, defendant wife. The Kentucky court
found he was the innocent party and accordingly granted
him a decree. The wife in the meantime had started an
action for separate maintenance in New York. Atherton
appeared and set up his Kentucky decree. The New York
court refused to recognize it and found that the wife was
the innocent party and accordingly granted her a decree.
The United States Supreme Court then held that the finding
of the Kentucky court that the husband was the innocent
party, and its decree accordingly upon only constructive service, was conclusive upon the wife and the New York court
because the domicile of the husband and the domicile of matrimony were both in that jurisdiction. Such reasoning, however, does not seem to be altogether persuasive. Because
the conclusion reached on this point in this case seemed
inconsistent with that reached in the Haddock case, Mr.
Justice Holmes stated in his dissent to the latter case that
he thought the Atherton case was overruled by the majority opinion in the Haddock case. This opinion was shared
in for some time by many of our very able legal writers.
But such seems not to be the case, for the Atherton case
was later followed in Thompson v. Thompson.15
Now suppose that instead of filing his action for divorce
in Kentucky, Mr. Atherton had moved to some other state
V

226 U. S. 551 (1913).
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and established a bont fide domicile and lived there the required time. Would he have been able to secure a decree
there upon constructive service which would have been
entitled to recognition in other states under Article 4, Section 1, of the Constitution? So far as the writer knows,
this question has not been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court. Its solution depends upon what is meant by
the term "matrimonial domicile." It may mean the place
where the parties last lived together as husband and wife;
or, it may mean the place where one spouse is rightfully
domiciled and where the other ought to be to fulfill the
marital obligation. The latter view has been taken in a
few decisions, of which Parker v. Parker1 6 and Montmorency
v. Montmorency17 are typical. However, a majority of our
courts have either held or assumed that the doctrine of
"matrimonial domicile" should be confined to the place
where the parties last lived together as husband and wife.
We may now consider the case where one party has gone
to another jurisdiction for the purpose of securing a divorce
and has stayed there long enough to meet the local statutory
requirements, neither of the parties being in fact domiciled
in the jurisdiction. Under this heading I shall discuss the
status of Yucatan divorce decrees in our courts. Many of
you, no doubt, have received, as I did some months ago,
a circular letter from a Yucatan attorney soliciting the
business of clients who might be desirous of securing a
Yucatan decree and also giving a general outline of the
requirements to be met in order to get such a decree. As
I recall that letter the principal requirement was sufficient
money to pay the state and national tax, court costs and
attorney's fee-twenty per cent of which fee would be remitted to the forwarding attorney. So far as the expenditure of time on the part of the plaintiff was concerned, that
was a relatively insignificant matter. The whole thing
could be handled in the space of from ten days to two
weeks. It further appeared that there was no necessity of
going to the trouble of sending any notice to the defendant.
From this it is clear that there is not even a colorable attempt to meet the requirements of jurisdiction that our
20222

Fed. 186 (1915).
AT139 S. W. 1168 (Tem

Civ. App. 1911).
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courts hold are necessary to entitle a foreign decree to
recognition. Since the jurisdiction of the court granting
the original decree may be inquired into, it would seem
that in the ordinary case it would be relatively easy to show
lack of bona fide residence or domicile. Furthermore, such a
course of conduct would perpetrate a fraud upon our courts
and our citizens, which our courts would not permit. Also
the fact that no notice is required to be sent to the defendant is so contrary to our notion of due process of law that it
Would be against our public policy to recognize such
decrees.
So far as the writer knows, no appellate court in the
United States has yet passed upon the validity of these
Yucatan decrees. They have, however, been passed upon
by the Superior Courts of this state. The first case, Dinsmore v. Dinsmore,came up in March of this year before Judge
Johnson of San Francisco. As reported in the daily press,
it appears that Mr. Dinsmore went down to Yucatan in
November, 1922, and there secured a divorce without Mrs.
Dinsmore's knowledge. On his way back to California he
married a San Francisco school teacher in Mexicali. Mrs.
Dinsmore filed suit against her husband, who set up the
Yucatan decree. Judge Johnson held that the Yucatan
decree was not entitled to recognition by the courts of this
state and consequently was no defense. Among other
things Judge Johnson is reported to have said: "No principle of international law requires the courts of this state
to permit a fraud on a citizen of California; and it is always
within the sovereignty of the State of California to deny
recognition to any foreign judgment which is in fraud of
the law of the land. Not only because of lack of jurisdiction is the Yucatan decree repugnant to our system of jurisprudence," he said, "but equally so because of the secrecy
with which the decree was procured."
The validity of a Yucatan decree was passed upon by
Judge Summerfield on the 21st of September in an annulment action brought byWinfield Scott, Jr., against Eunice
Lorraine Ginter, No. D-42526. Judge Summerfield also
held the Yucatan decree invalid. These decisions would
seem to be abundantly justified both upon reasoh and
principle.
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The result would still seem. to be the same even if the
defendant were given notice, such as service by publication. It has been held by the United States Supreme Court in
Bell v. Bell18 and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf" that a decree rendered by one of our states under such circumstances is not entitled to recognition in another under Article 4, Section 1, of
the Constitution. Both of these cases were cited with approval
by Mr. Chief Justice Waste in Anthony v. Tarpley, supra. In
that case he made the further observation that, "In order to entitle one to maintain a divorce action the residence must be
bona tide. Going into another state with the intention of returning to this, when the divorce has been procured, is not the
establisment of a bona fide residence or domicile." It does
not seem likely that we would recognize a Mexican decree
on the principles of comity when we would not be compelled to recognize a decree granted by the courts of a
sister state under the same circumstances. But the situation has been complicated in some cases by the fact that
the defendant has appeared in the action. Will this give
the court jurisdiction so that it may grant a valid decree?
That question was presented to the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Andrews v. Andrews.20 The issue in the
Andrews Case arose in this way: Andrews had obtained a decree of divorce in South Dakota, in which state he had taken up
a residence for the time prescribed by law, but in which he had
never acquired a bona fide domicile. The referee had found,
and his finding was accepted by the court, -that "his (Andrews') intention was to become a resident of that state for
the purpose of getting a divorce and to that end to do all
that was needful to make him such a resident." The defendant in the South Dakota suit entered a personal appearance, pleaded, and for a while, at least, contested the
action, though her contest was afterwards abandoned.
Andrews' divorce was granted and he moved back to Massachusetts, where he married again and subsequently died.
The contest was between the first and second Mrs. Andrews
as to the right to administer his estate, each claiming to
be the widow. Since the question of jurisdiction of the
South Dakota court might be inquired into and the decree
181 U. S. 175 (1901).
181 U. S. 179 (1901).
188 U. S. 14 (1902).
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collaterally attacked under the previous decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, it was held that the decree was
invalid because there was not a bona fide domicile and that
neithek the appearance of the defendant nor the consent of the
parties could confer jurisdiction over the subject matter. This
case was followed and quoted at length by Mr. Chief Justice
Waste in Anthony v. Tarpley, supra.
It seems to the writer that the principles of the Andrews
Case offer a solution to the question as to how far decrees
rendered by French courts will be recognized in this country on the principles of international comity. It would perhaps first be well to make at least a cursory examination of
the requisites for obtaining a divorce in the French courts.
It is said that in order to give the French court jurisdiction of an action for divorce the plaintiff must be domiciled
in France. But it should be remembered that the term
"domicile" as used and understood in French law does not
mean the same thing as it means in our law. In France it
means nothing more than residence, so that the rule iL
that a plaintiff must be resident in France in order to give
the French courts jurisdiction. It is also said that if this
residence is in good faith no length of time is required to
establish it. Thus one may go to France with the intention
of residing there and immediately establish such a residence as to give the court jurisdiction.
While the French law still seems to follow the old theory
that the domicile of the wife is the domicile of the husband,
yet, as a practical matter, the French courts take the position that since under our law a woman may acquire a domicile separate and apart from that of the husband, she may
have the same privilege in France. So, at the outset of the
litigation, the French judge designates a separate domicile
for the wife by a formal order.
In an attempt to insure recognition of the French decrees
in our courts it is the usual practice to get personal jurisdiction of the defendant. This is done by getting personal service of process upon the defendant within the jurisdiction of
the French court, or an appearance by counsel for defendant through a warrant of attorney.
As to whether or not French decrees will be recognized
by the courts of the United States depends very largely up-
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on the facts and circumstances in each particular case. If
one of the parties has established a bona fide domicile there in
the sense in which that term is used and understood in our
law and the other party is either personally served within
the jurisdiction of the court or voluntarily appears through
counsel, it would seem clear that the court had acquired
proper jurisdiction to award a decree which would be recognized by the courts of this country under the principles
of comity. This proposition is fairly illustrated by the case
of Lie v. Lie. 21 In this case it appeared that after the husband
and wife had for some years lived in New York the wife
went to Norway in 1913. In 1915 the husband followed her
to Norway and there obtained a decree of divorce against
her. The defendant wife continued to live there and later
married in Norway. The first husband came back to New
York and filed another suit against her, alleging her cohabitation with the second husband was adulterous on
the theory that they were not legally divorced on the
ground that the court of Norway did not have jurisdiction.
It would seem that the Norway court might very reasonably have found that the defendant wife who had lived
there for two years had established a domicile there. It
was also clear that her going to Norway was not for the
purpose of procuring a divorce and perpetrating a fraud
either upon our courts or upon those of our citizens since
she was the defendant in the action.
It should also be
remembered both parties were before the court. In view
of these facts and circumstance the New York court very
properly held that the Norway court had jurisdiction
and that the decree rendered by it was entitled to recognition by their courts.
If, on the other hand, actual domicile in the American
sense does not in fact exist at the time the action is filed in a
French court, it seems very likely that our courts will hold
that the subject matter was not within the jurisdiction of
the French courts and that their decree is not entitled to
extra-territorial effect. To hold otherwise would be to give
to a decree of a foreign tribunal greater extra-territorial
effect than is given to the decree of a court of a sister state
and we can hardly suppose that this will be done. The Wis2 96 N. Y. Misc. 8, 159 N. Y. S. 748 (1916).
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consin court followed this principle in St. Cure v. Lindsfet 22
in refusing to recognize a decree rendered in Sweden in
favor of the wife while both parties were domiciled in that
state. This is also the view taken by the English courts. A
good illustration of the rule in England is Shaw v. Gould23
in which the House of Lords held void in England a
Scotch divorce granted to English subjects on mere residence without legal domicile, even though the question at
issue with regard to such divorce was the legitimacy of
children born of a subsequent attempted marriage of one
of the parties.
The situation presented to the English courts in dealing
with Scotch divorces, at a time when Scotch courts required something less than domicile, is the situation that
will be presented to American courts in dealing with French
divorces to Americans under a requirement of residence
that is less than domicile. Bearing in mind that the general
principles enunciated by our courts on this question of conilict of laws are the same as those recognized in England,
the conclusion seems justified that the attitude to be taken
l)y our courts with regard to French decrees will be the
same as that taken by English courts with regard to Scotch
decrees.
So far as I can find there is only one American case which
is out of harmony with the views expressed above. That
is, the case of Gould v. Gould, decided by the New York Court
of Appeals. 24 The facts in the case were very unusual and
undoubtedly made a strong appeal to the court. The
husband was originally domiciled in New York and
according to the decree of the French court, maintained
his legal domicile in that state. He was married in
Scotland and he and his wife took up their matrimonial
domicile in France and had lived there together for
about six years before any dissention developed between
them. Both parties instituted suits for divorce in French
courts and a decree was finally granted to the husband.
The Court of Appeals, in discussing the case, states
that after the marriage the parties "came to reside perma- 82 Wis. 346, 52 N.

W. 808 (1892).

- L. R. 8 H. L. 55 (1868).
"

275 N.

Y. 14, 138 N.

E. 490 (1923).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss2/3

16

Fox: The Recognition of Foreign Decrees of Divorce
THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES OF DIVORCE i55
nently in France." It also says that even at the time of the
litigation in New York the husband had "no apparent intention to return to this state * * * but to permanently reside in France." These facts would appear to show the
animus manendi and would have justified a finding that legal
domicile existed in France, but for the fact that the French
decree itself had recited that the husband was domiciled in
New York. Both the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals sustained the validy of this decree in New York,
influenced undoubtedly by the strong appeal of the particular facts of the case.
The Appellate Division based its opinion on the theory
that jurisdiction may be based on a "matrimonial domicile"
at a place where neither of the spouses has a legal domicile, citing as authority for this conclusion the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in the Haddock, Atherton
and Thompson Cases. It is, however, apparent that these
decisions are not authority for this conclusion because in the
Atherton and Thompson Cases there existed both the "matrimonial domicile" and individual domicile of the plaintiff
and hence both decrees were recognized, while in Haddock's Connecticut Case one of these elements was absent
and the decree was not recognized. It is interesting
to note, however, that the Court of Appeals does not repeat
the views of the Appellate Division in this respect, but simply rests its decision upon the statement that, while in the
absence of a legal domicile it is not required to recognize a
foreign decree, it is not, under the particular facts of the
Gould Case, a violation of the public policy of the state of
New York for it to do so.
While others may very rationally disagree with respect
to the theories advanced regarding the proposition last discussed, it .is submitted that most, if not all of us, will agree
with the next proposition, viz., that if one of our citizens goes
to France merely for the purpose of staying there long
enough to secure a divorce decree and then immediately returning to this country,. such a decree is not entitled to
recognition by our courts even though the defendant is personally served in France or appears through an attorney.
Such conduct would seem to very clearly show there was
no bona fide residence or domicile and to constitute a fraud
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upon our courts in a matter in which the state as a third
party is vitally interested. Since our United States Supreme
Court has already very difinitely held in the Andrews Case,
as previously pointed out, that consent of the parties cannot
confer jurisdiction and since the question of jurisdiction
may be inquired into, it would seem to inevitably follow
that if the defendant could show lack of good faith on the
part of the plaintiff our courts would not recognize the
decree. That California courts will come to this conclusion, when the question is presented to them, is indicated
by the fact that we have already approved the Andrews
Case. This was the conclusion reached by our local Superior Court in May of this year in the case of Godissort v. Godissort,in which Judge Hollzer held that the decree which had
previously been obtained in Paris was not valid. This would
seem to be the only reasonable and logical conclusion that
could be reached under our established public policy and legal principles.
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